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From Garden Apartments To Cattle To
Pistachio Groves: Regulating Tax
Shelters In California

BRIAN R. VAN CAMP*

Because the number of investors purchasing tax sheltered investment programs has increased so significantly in recent years,
California has begun to more closely scrutinize the sale of these
interests. Since such programs qualify as securities, they are
governed by the Corporate Securities Law of California, which
requires that a permit be obtained from the Commissioner of
Corporations certifying that the public offering is fair, just, and
equitable. In this article Brian Van Camp, California's Commissioner of Corporations,reviews the administration of the laws and
regulations governing the various tax shelter investments and points
out the kinds of factors which the Commissioner's office considers
in determining the fairness of each type of investment program.

Sales of tax sheltered investment programs in California are climbmg to new heights every year. From July until December 1972
alone, this type of investment accounted for over one billion dollars

worth of securities registered with the California Department of Corporations (hereinafter referred to as "Department").
* A.B. University of California, Berkeley, 1962; LL.B. University of California,
Boalt Hall, 1965. California Commissioner of Corporations since 1971. President of
the Midwest Securities Commissioners Association since June 1973.
The author wishes to acknowledge Mr. Richard Bruck, Corporations Counsel in
the Los Angeles Office of the Department of Corporations, for his material assistance
in the research of this article. Recognition is also extended to Mr. Willie R. Barnes,

Assistant Commissioner, for his significant contribution to the development of tax
shelter law.
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As securities, tax shelter interests must be qualified under the Corporate Securities Law of California and receive a permit from the Commissioner certifying that offerings are fair, just, and equitable. Until
the last few years, the qualification of the offer and sale of these program interests was not of significant concern, since they were few in
number and were primarily sold to persons in very high income tax
brackets. Those persons could usually afford to protect their own interests and therefore did not look to the State for much assistance
in determining the fairness of these programs. With the great increase
in dollar volume and number of persons participating in these programs, however, tax shelters of necessity have become a major concern to securities law administrators throughout the country. The purpose of this article is to review the administration of these laws as they
pertain to tax shelters in real estate ventures, oil and gas drilling activities, cattle feeding and breeding programs, and crop syndications.
Regulators who attempt to arrive at a determination of fairness for
each of these investment vehicles must appreciate the differences in
risk presented to the public and the different tax needs that each is
designed to solve. Hopefully, this review of the Department's present
regulation of these different vehicles will show the kinds of factors which
enter into the Department's determination of fairness of a particular
tax shelter program.
While the primary purpose of blue sky law administrators is to see
that the shareholder or limited partner gets a fair shake, the Department also has a concomitant obligation to ensure that the aggregation
of capital is not unnecessarily hindered or strangled by governmental
regulations which have no sound basis in the furtherance of investor
protection.
The business pursuits of most tax shelter programs have been
deemed by Congress to be of high social value and therefore deserving of special tax treatment as an encouragement to engage in that
business. Thus, national housing goals are furthered by real estate syndicators who provide new housing units, especially those built for low
income persons. New oil and gas reserves discovered by drilling funds
help combat the energy crisis. Cattle and crops syndications generate funds to increase the production of essential food and fiber products.
When capital is raised from the public by responsible persons on
fair terms and is employed successfully in these ventures, the promoters, the investors, and the society all benefit. Making this process
work is the task the Department addresses in administering the
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Corporate Securities Laws of California.'
REAL ESTATE

SYNDICATIONS

Real estate syndications through limited partnerships are perhaps
the most popular tax sheltered investment vehicle today. There has
been a continuing trend to update the regulatory guidelines applicable
to real estate syndications and to achieve a harmonious, uniform set of
rules to be applied to real estate syndications universally. The California Department of Corporations, the Midwest Securities Commissioners (an organization of 24 state securities law administrators),
and the National Association of Securities Dealers have conceived a
set of rules that is compatible with the regulatory philosophy of each
of the several agencies. In February 1973, the Midwest Securities
Commissioners, meeting in San Francisco, adopted guidelines for
the offer and sale of real estate syndications. These guidelines will
probably be applied consistently by most of the state blue sky law administrators in the country. The new California rules differ only
slightly from the final draft adopted by the Midwest Commissioners.2
Studies have been made of both successful and unsuccessful syndicates, in order to determine the most important areas of regulation. The final version of the California rules for the offer and sale
of real estate programs tightens regulation in many of the areas
thought to be the cause of many syndication failures in the past.
Front-EndCompensation
In real estate syndications, the front-end compensation and expenses to the partnership include the selling and organizational expenses and the acquisition and developmental fees and commissions
paid from the invested capital. In the past, many syndications have
encountered difficulty when too much of the invested capital is paid
out in fees and commissions leaving an inadequate amount to be put
into the property. Under the recently repealed California law, the
selling expenses should not exceed 15 percent of the initial invested capital.8 The new California rule carries this limitation for4
ward.
Organization and offering expenses are defined in the new Cali1. CAL. CORP.CODE §25000 et seq.

2. This is primarily because the Midwest draft is based largely on an earlier
California draft which the author presented as Co-Chairman of the Midwest Committee on Real Estate Limited Partnerships.
3. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit.10, §260.140.111(c) (repealed April 6,1973; effective
May 10, 1973).
4. Id. §260.140.113.2 (adopted April 6, 1973; effective May 10, 1973).
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fomia Real Estate Rules as those expenses incurred in preparing
a program for registration and subsequently offering and distributing
it to the public, including sales commissions paid to broker-dealers in
connection with the distribution of the program. 5 It should be
pointed out that organization and offering expenses may only be paid
for obligations which are actually incurred. The 15 percent limit is
not automatically allowed as compensation.
Whereas the old California guidelines provided that the total amount
of compensation of all kinds to promoters had to be reasonable, and that
a standard real estate commission would be permissible, if shown
to be competitive, the new rules modify this approach. Frontend compensation for acquisition services is subject to the overall
test of reasonableness for each fee. In addition, the total of all
such compensation paid to everyone involved in the transaction by
the program and/or any other person shall be deemed presumptively reasonable only if it does not exceed 18 percent of the gross
proceeds of the offering. 6 Further, such fee may not exceed the normal
rate for similar services in the locality where provided. 7 The acquisition
fee paid to the sponsor is reduced to the extent that other real estate commissions, acquisition fees, or other fees or commissions are paid by
any person in connection with the transaction. 8 Thus there is no
maximum real estate commission paid by the program. However,
third party commissions reduce the amount of any front-end commissions paid to the sponsor or his affiliate. Finally, the sum of the purchase price of the program's properties plus the acquisition fees may
not exceed the appraised value of the properties.'
Historically, program managers and sponsors have been permitted
a property management fee upon a showing that the fee is competitive
with that charged for similar services by professional property managers. 10 The new rules carry forth the overall test of reasonableness
and also provide explicit authority for the general partner to receive
management fees where a program owns unimproved land or government subsidized projects. With respect to unimproved land, the
general partner may be entitled to receive annual compensation not
exceeding one-quarter of one percent of the costs of such unimproved
land for operating the program until the land is sold or improved, up
to a cumulative total of 2 percent of the original cost, regardless of
5. Id. §260.140.110.2(o).
6. Id. §260.140.113.3(b).
7. Id. §260.140.113.3(a).
8. Id. §260.140.113.3(b).
9. Id. §260.140.113.3(d).

10. Id. §260.140.111(a) and (c) (repealed).
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the number of years held. 1 Where government subsidized projects
are held, annual compensation cannot exceed one-half of one percent
of the cost of such property during the entire time the property is
held.'
Finally, strict limitations have been placed upon commissions to
be received upon resale of the property of the program. These
commissions may not exceed one-half of the standard commission
and must be subordinated to a 100 percent return of the investors'
capital plus the stated percentage return. The commissions must
also be approved by a majority of the limited partners. No commissions may be paid to a syndicator in connection with the reinvestment
of the proceeds from the resale, exchange, or refinancing of the syndicate property.' 3 The new California Real Estate Rules permit reasonable promotional interests. The following interests are considered presumptively reasonable: (1) a 25 percent subordinated interest in the undistributed amounts after a 100 percent return to the
investors of capital contribution; or (2) a subordinated interest
equal to (a) 10 percent of the distributions from cash available for
distribution, and (b) 15 percent of the distribution to investors from
the proceeds on the sale or refinancing of the properties after payment to investors of 100 percent of their capital contribution, plus a
6 percent per annum cumulative return less the sum of prior distribu14
tions.
Upon review of the entire compensation picture, it is apparent that
the general test of reasonableness of the prior California law has been
supplanted by more definite standards, with presumptively reasonable
limits within which a sponsor can operate his program. Enactment of
such standards should result in a uniform approach to regulation of
real estate syndication offerings.
Suitability Standards
Since tax shelter is one of the primary goals of the investor, real estate syndications have generally attempted to maximize ultimate tax
benefits. In a highly leveraged real estate syndication, the risk is
increased because of the large mortgage carried. In addition, syndications have limited transferability of interest and limited investor
democracy rights. The old suitability standard that the proposed investors must have a financial responsibility commensurate with the
11.
12.
13.
14.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

§260.140.113.4(a).
§260.140.113.4(b).
§260.140.113.6.
§260.140.113.5(a) and (b).
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proposed investment 15 had only limited success. The new rules seek
to specify the exact kind of investor who is "suitable" for the particular program. Sponsors will be required to set forth in the prospectus
the investment objectives of the syndicate, a description of the type
of person who could benefit from the program, and the suitability
standards to be applied in marketing it.16 The application of the
standards looks toward the amount of deductible tax losses during
the year of the investment, realizing that such investments involve
more than an ordinary risk. A substantial net worth would therefore
be required to participate in such a program.
The burden of finding that a person fits the prescribed suitability
standards is placed upon the syndicator and each person selling
limited partnership interests on behalf of the syndicate.' 7 The sponsor must ascertain whether or not a particular investor can benefit
from the program by analyzing the nature of his employment experience, educational level, access to professional advice, and experience in prior investments.' 8 The sponsor must further ascertain that the
investor understands and appreciates the risks involved, as well as
the consequences of his investment.' 9
Given this background, the new rules attempt again to establish
presumptively reasonable standards for the suitability of an investor
and for the minimum investment in a particular program. California
now requires a $2,000 minimum initial cash purchase per investor
on all offerings.20 The Department will also employ the following presumptively reasonable suitability standards for participants in real
estate syndications: either (1) a minimum annual gross income of
$20,000 and a net worth of $20,000, or (2) a minimum net worth
of $75,000. It should be noted that net worth shall be determined
exclusive of home, furnishings, and automobiles. The California
Real Estate Rules further specify that in high risk or principally tax
oriented offerings, higher suitability standards may be required. 21
Net Worth and Experience Requirements of the GeneralPartner
In light of the general partner's unlimited liability under law on behalf of the partnership, the Department requires the general partner
to have adequate financial ability to perform his obligations. The
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Id. §260.140.114 (repealed).

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

§260.140.112.1.
§260.140.112.2.
§260.140.112.2(b)(1).
§260.140.112.2(b)(2).
§260.140.112.4.
§260.140.112.5.
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new California Real Estate Rules provide a standard which is modeled
after the safe-harbor rule followed by the Internal Revenue Service.
At a minimum, the sponsor is required to have a financial net worth
equal to the greater of either (1) $50,000, or (2) an amount at
least equal to 5 percent of the offering sold within the prior twelve
months, plus 5 percent of the gross amount of the current offering,
to a maximum net worth of $1,000,000.22 Additionally, he must
present evidence of his ability to maintain the required net worth
for a period of three years after consummation of the offering.
In the area of the experience requirements of management, setting
a minimum standard as adequate experience poses a difficult problem. The California Real Estate Rules opted for an alternative standard by providing that the sponsor, general partner, or affiliate providing services to the program shall have not less than four years relevant experience in this particular service, or otherwise must demonthe services or manage the
strate sufficient knowledge to 2perform
3
acquired.
be
to
type of properties
It has been alleged that the principal reason for the failure of syndications was that the syndicator lacked the experience to successfully
engage in selection or acquisition of properties and to structure them
financially. Consequently, the prospectus or offering circular must
disclose the business experience of the sponsor for the past ten
years. Any lack of experience must be disclosed as a risk factor for
the investor to consider in making his investment. 4 Thus the law still
allows for discretion by the Commissioner where the four-year presumptively reasonable standard has not been met and mandates a disclosure requirement to apprise the investor of the significant risk he
may be taking.
Conflicts of Interest

The new rules set forth many prohibitions and restrictions on
transactions among promoters, affiliates, and syndicates. The sponsor may only sell or lease property to the syndicate upon the formation thereof and may make such sale or lease only upon terms fair
to the syndicate and at a price not in excess of the property's appraised value. Should the promoter's cost be less than the price to be
paid by the syndicate, the transaction will not be deemed fair regardless
of the appraised value, unless the sponsor can show that there was a
material factor or change which has occurred in the property which
22. Id. §260.140.111.2.
23. Id. §260.140.111.1.
24. Id. §260.140.117.3(d).
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would increase the value since the date the sponsor purchased said
property. 5 Of course, full disclosure of the transaction and the
terms thereof must be made in the prospectus. While the new rules
will not ordinarily permit the sale of property by the syndicate to the
sponsor, flat-out prohibitions are made upon loans by the syndicate
to the sponsor or an affiliate, or acquisitions of property from a program in which the sponsor has an interest.2 6
The new rules delineate numerous other areas which are deemed
conflicts of interest between a program and a sponsor, including exclusive agreements between a sponsor and a program to sell the property for the program, 27 a commission or fee paid to a sponsor in connection with the investment of the proceeds of the resale, exchange, or
refinancing of the property,28 insurance brokerage fees received by the
sponsor on any of its property, 29 or other rebates, kickbacks, or other
reciprocal arrangements which would tend to circumvent these rules.80
Disclosures
Under prior law, the Commissioner required disclosure of all material information relating to the investment, compensation, profit to
promoters, or assessments to the investors.31 In theory, all "material
information" could be broadly interpreted to mean anything within
the discretion of the administrator. The new California Real Estate
Rules, in exhaustive detail, list the information required to be included in the prospectus of the program.32 The business experience,
compensation to the general partners, assessments, and risk factors
have already been mentioned. Additionally, the Department will require
extensive explanations of the investment objectives and policies of the
syndicate and an explanation of the past experience (the "track record"
of the sponsor or its affiliates33 ) including a five-year history of the
previous syndicate experience of the sponsor or other affiliate. Disclosures required include the location of syndicate property, the effective
date of the offering, the total amount of the interest offered, the types of
property acquired, the total dollar amounts of federal tax items which
were deductible and passed on to the investor, the amount of cash
distributions to the investor, the compensation to the sponsors, and a
25. Id. §260.140.114.1(a).
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
id.
Id.
Id.

§260.140.114.1(b), (c) and (d).
§260.140.114.3.
§260.140.114.4.
§260.140.114.5(a).
§260.140.114.6(a).
§260.140.115 (repealed).
§260.140.117.3.
§260.140.117(i), (k).
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comparison between all projected and actual results.14 The Commissioner has the discretion to require additional information to fairly present
the track record of a syndicator. 35 In my opinion, this is a significant
step forward in the area of required disclosures in the offering circulars
of real estate syndications.
Taxation
The previous policy of the Department, requiring extensive discussion in the prospectus of the federal tax consequences of the offering in the form of an opinion of tax counsel, has been retained in the
new rules. 36 The opinion of counsel should set forth the legal basis
for the conclusion that the entity will be taxed as a "partnership"
and not as an "association." Also, there should be adequate discussion of the "partnership characteristics" claimed for the entity for income tax purposes. Where no Internal Revenue Service ruling has
been requested, it should be pointed out that the Internal Revenue
Service may challenge the partnership classification upon audit. Additionally, appropriate disclosure should be made as to the adverse tax
consequence of classifying the entity as an "association" taxable as
a "corporation," rather than as a partnership.
Taxation and Investor Democracy Rights
The Internal Revenue Service views the "continuity of life" characteristic as an important element in the determination of whether the
particular entity under review is an association or a partnership for tax
purposes. Further, in the past few months the Internal Revenue
Service has taken a position on "continuity of life" which operates to
directly affect limited partnerships in California-that a limited partnership, which is subject to a statute corresponding to the Uniform
Limited Partnership Act, lacks "continuity of life."137 The problem
arises in that, in the opinion of the Internal Revenue Service, the
version of the Uniform Limited Partnership Act adopted in California
does not so "correspond." Therefore, a partnership subject to the
California statutory scheme for limited partnerships will indeed possess
"continuity of life" and thus lose its partnership tax status, if its organizers elect to include, in the partnership agreement, a provision
allowing for the continuation of the partnership by less than unanimous
vote of all the limited partners upon the death, retirement, removal,
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id. §260.140.117.3(k)(2)(i)-(ix).
Id. §260.140.117.3(k)(2)(x).
Id. §260.140.117.3(o)(1)-(7), (v).
Treas. Reg. §301.701-2(b) (3) (1960).
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or bankruptcy of the general partner. Such an agreement clause is
permissible under California law. 8
Recognizing the jeopardy to many limited partners created by the
posture assumed by the Internal Revenue Service, the Commissioner has
taken the interim position that it will be permissible for the partnership
agreement to require a vote of 100 percent of the limited partners to
continue the partnership upon the death, retirement, removal, or bankruptcy of the general partner. However, such an agreement must still
provide for only a majority vote to remove the general partner and to approve termination of the partnership. Further, there should be a provision in the agreement that a majority of the limited partners may elect to
continue the partnership if prior to the occurrence of a terminating
event, such as death, retirement, or removal of the general partner, it
has been established by either (a) a final appellate federal court decision or (b) a published revenue ruling by the Internal Revenue Service that, for income tax purposes, a continuation of the partnership by
a vote of less than all of the limited partners will not cause the partnership to have the corporate characteristic of "continuity of life" for purposes of determining whether or not the partnership will be taxed as
a partnership or as an association. The Department is continuing its
efforts to persuade the Internal Revenue Service not to penalize limited partners in California simply because they claim for investors certain democratic rights given to them under California law.
Additions under Disclosure
The final innovative area of disclosure-the use of projections-is
extensively covered in the California Real Estate Rules.30 California
has been applying liberal standards for projections, encouraging them
when they are based on actual operating results. California has always required as a basis for the predictions that disclosure be made of
the supporting assumptions and source of data. The new rules40 provide that projections shall be permitted in the offering circular if
they are for a period of at least ten years or equivalent to the anticipated holding period of the property, whichever is less. They must
definitely project a resale. The projections must disclose the required
occupancy rate in order to meet the debt service. All expenses and
rental revenues must be predicted, based on occupancy rates below
the break-even occupancy rate. The projections must also predict
annual cash flow and give the assumed occupancy rates therefor.
38. CAL. ADmwN. CODE tit. 10, §260.140.110(b); CAL. CoRP. CODE §15507(b), (c).
39. Id. §260.140.117.4.
40. Id. §260.140.117.4(a)(4).
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They must predict the annual depreciation and amortization, describing the methods used, together with annual income or loss and an
explanation of the tax treatment of the results. 4 1 Projections are not
allowed for unimproved land; however, a table of deferred payments
specifying the various holding costs such as interest, taxes, and insurance must be included. 42 Additional disclosures may be required
where the program intends to develop and sell the unimproved land.
Although only a few of the requirements
been touched upon, one can readily see that
comprehensive scheme for regulating the use
fering circular to provide more meaningful
closures to investors.

of the projections have
the new rules provide a
of projections in the ofand nonmisleading dis-

SUBSIDIZED HOUSING SYNDICATES
In general, the rules relating to real estate syndications also apply to
subsidized housing syndicates. However, there are certain unique aspects of subsidized housing syndicates which may require differing
standards of regulation. Most offerings of subsidized housing syndicates are exempted under the provisions of the California Corporate
Securities Law;4 3 and since there is limited activity in this area, many of
the rules regarding subsidized housing syndicates are applied on a
case-by-case basis. The investor benefits of a subsidized housing syndicate are different than in the normal tax-oriented real estate syndication. The motivating factor for investors is usually the accelerated depreciation offered over the life of the program and some
regular, if minimal, cash flow every year. One factor which increases the risk in subsidized housing syndicates is the relatively slight
Therefore, the
prospect for profits on resale of the property.
Department has generally imposed suitability standards of (a) a liquid net worth of at least $50,000, and (b) annual income, some of
which is taxable in the 50 percent income tax bracket under the Internal Revenue Code.
Compensation Structure
In subsidized housing syndicates the syndicators usually seek
large front-end compensation from the proceeds of the public offering
because cash flow is usually limited, with few residual proceeds. The
publicly offered subsidized housing syndicates usually consist of a
41. Id. §260.140.117.4(a)(2)(iv)-(viii).
42. Id. §260.140.117.4(b).
43. CAL. CORP. CODE §25102(f); CAL. ADmIN. CODE tit. 10, §260.140.102.2.
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"two-tier" partnership arrangement. The "top-tier" partnership has
the syndicator as a general partner and the public investors as limited
partners. It is basically a blind pool of capital which the general
partner will invest in a series of local "lower-tier" partnerships, each
of which owns equity in a project. The developer is the general partner and the top-tier partnership is the sole limited partner in the lowertier partnership. This arrangement presents serious questions as to
what amount of compensation is reasonable and fair under the circumstances. The reasonable standard of former Section 260.140.111(a)
has been used. Presumably, the Department will modify this in the
future to conform more closely to the new Real Estate Rules.
The Department takes the position that the local developer is a "syndicator" for the purpose of application of the rules. Therefore, the
price at which the local developer sells a project to the syndicate becomes important because a profit
on the sale of property by the syndi44
cator is not normally permitted.
Experience Requirement of Management
The experience of management is a crucial factor in the success of
the syndicate. Also, the quality and experience of the local developer and his financial capability are important considerations.
Investor Democracy Rights
In relation to the basic investor rights required by law, 45 the question arises whether, even if the "lower-tier" partnerships provide the
same investor rights as are required by the "top-tier" partnership,
can the public investors effectively exercise those rights without direct
participation in the "lower-tier" partnership? Despite contrary determinations by the Federal Housing Administration, the Department
takes the position that the California rules and law seem to require
that investors have the ability to meaningfully assert their rights. Any
significant inhibition upon the enforceability of these rights would run
counter to the basic tenets of investor democracy.
OIL AND GAS PROGRAMS

The tax shelter afforded to an investor in an oil and gas program depends on the kind of program in which he invests. The riskiness of
an investment depends upon the activities of the program and its atti44. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 10, §260.140.111(c).
45. CAL. COREP. CODE §15507(b), (c).
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tude toward immediate income. An exploratory oil and gas program is one whose major activity is the search for new petroleum reserves. The oil and gas operator and investors join forces to conduct
oil and gas exploration. Generally speaking, the operator supplies
the knowledge and experience and the investor supplies the needed
capital. The tax advantages of petroleum exploration programs are
based on the fact that intangible drilling and completion costs are deductible for federal income tax purposes. To the extent that his oil
and gas investment reflects expenditures for such items, an investor
can offset his investment against his ordinary income received from
other sources. Additionally, he is entitled to a deduction for depletion
on the income derived from the production and sale of oil and gas and
other minerals. There is a substantial probability that oil and gas
properties may not be discovered in productive quantities and thus
there is a high risk of loss of the total investment.
Developmental programs in oil and gas have, as their principal
activity, the development of existing petroleum reserves, rather than
the search for new reserves. In general, semi-proven and proven prospects are successful in 50 to 75 percent of all cases. Although the
risk is less, the value paid for the leases in proven and semi-proven
areas is always higher. Other kinds of programs involve balanced
arrangements providing for both exploration and development.
Oil and gas programs, with their varied methods of compensation
structure, are of particular interest to the regulators, including California. The basic set of guidelines is Title 10, California Administrative Code, Section 260.140.120 et seq. These rules, however, have
not kept pace with newly emerging programs, and therefore, as of this
writing, the Commissioner has recently appointed a blue ribbon committee of distinguished oil and gas attorneys from California, Texas,
and Oklahoma to assist the Department in drafting a more modem
system of regulating these programs. Promoter's compensation, suitability standards of investors, management experience, and disclosure
are the key areas under scrutiny.
Promoter'sCompensation and Expenses
In most instances, the manager or promoter generally gets paid
more as his performance improves. There are many different forms
of compensation structures, such as front-end interest, overriding
royalties, net profit interests, working interest after pay out, functional
allocation, etc. In any event, the total amount of compensation, of all
kinds, to promoters should be reasonable in light of the nature of the
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exploration and development proposed and the identity of the investors.46 Additionally, promoters may be reimbursed out of the proceeds of the sale of the program interests for actual and necessary
expenses paid by the promoters for the purpose of exploration and development. These expenses may include the acquisition and maintenance of leaseholds, except when a "functional allocation" method of
compensation is used.47 Under a functional allocation method of
compensation, tangible or capital costs are paid by the promoters and
intangible or noncapital costs are paid by the investors, with revenues
being shared at specific percentages. In situations where a functional
allocation program method is used, the Department takes the position
that if the aggregate percentage of revenues payable to a promoter
does not exceed by more than 15 percent the aggregate cost borne
by the promoters, then such a promotional interest is presumptively
reasonable. The cost should be computed on the basis of the total
program and not on a well-by-well or drilling block basis. A reasonable overriding royalty or net profit interest which entitles the promoter to an immediate share of production may be paid to the promoter only in those instances where no other compensation, except commissions and management fees or direct reimbursement for actual exploration and development expenses, is paid to the promoter.48
An overriding royalty is basically a percentage of the gross income of
the program. The principal difference between a net profit interest
and an overriding royalty is that an overriding royalty is a percentage
of gross income, while a net profit interest is a percentage of net income. An overriding royalty or net profit interest which does not
exceed 3/32nds of the syndicate's share of production is deemed presumptively reasonable under California law. 49 Alternatively, a promoter may take a promotional interest in the form of a subordinated
percentage of the working interest or a subordinated net profit royalty
interest which does not exceed 33 1/3 percent of the working interest.
A subordinated interest should provide for a 100 percent return of
the investor's invested capital before the promoter receives subordinated working or net profit royalty interest.r0 Syndicators will not be
permitted, in defining "pay-out," to exclude certain amounts of the investor's contributions, such as amounts which go to pay selling expenses.
46. CA.. ADum. CODE tit. 10,

§260.140.120(a).

47. Id. §260.140.120(d).
48. Id. §260.140.120(b), (c), (d).

49. Id. §260.140.120(b).
50. Id. §260.140.120(c).
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Section 260.140.120 creates an anomalous situation. It requires the
promoter to elect between a subordinated working interest, which does
not participate in production until a 100 percent return has been
achieved on invested capital by the investor, and an overriding royalty or net profit interest which entitles the promoter to a front-end,
immediate share of production. From the viewpoint of most experts, the net participation of the promoter under either alternative is
substantially the same because an overriding royalty percentage may
be worth about three or four times as much as the corresponding working
interest. In sum, a promoter may receive organizational expenses
and management fees of 10 percent of the invested capital and either a
promotional interest in the form of a 33 1/3 percent working interest
subordinated to a 100 percent return to the investors of their initial
capital, or an overriding royalty or net profit interest of 3/32nds, or
under a functional allocation method a 15 percent promotional interest. Promoters may be reimbursed out of the proceeds of the sale
of the program interests for exploration and development expenses if
they do not elect the functional allocation method of compensation.
Suitability Standards
The exploration and development of oil and gas properties involves
a highly speculative investment undertaking. Generally, investments
should be limited to those classes of investors who are sophisticated and
experienced and will be able to avail themselves of the advantages and
benefits of this type of investment. Whether a particular investor
is suitable for an oil and gas investment depends on the kind of program, his investment objectives, and his individual situation, both
in terms of income tax bracket and net worth. An investor in oil and
gas programs should have a minimum annual income and net worth
which is suitable for the proposed investment.5 He should also be
in a tax bracket which will permit him to realize a reasonable income
tax benefit from the proposed investment, regardless of the success of
the venture.52 The Department has been applying the following suitability standards: (1) a $50,000 net worth during the previous tax
year, or an estimate that the investor will have a $50,000 net worth
during the current tax year and a current annual income which places
him in the 50 percent federal income tax bracket, or (2) net worth of
at least $200,000. Additionally, the investor should have the requisite investment experience and availability of independent advice to
evaluate the inherent risks of the proposed investment.
51. Id. §260.140.2.
52. Id. §260.140.2.
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Where the securities are being sold by brokers registered under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, there will be no prior independent
review of an investor's qualifications. Where the securities are being sold by persons other than brokers registered under the Act, an application for qualification must present information satisfactory to the
Department to qualify each investor under the prescribed standards.
In oil and gas programs which are organized for the purpose of investing substantially all of their assets in oil producing properties and
which are prohibited from engaging in exploratory operations, in light
of the lower risk ordinarily a lower suitability standard for the investor will be deemed presumptively reasonable: (1) a net worth of
$35,000 and an annual income of $20,000, or (2) a net worth of
$100,000.
As in real estate syndications, a minimum purchase is required in
oil and gas exploratory programs. Ordinarily an investor must make
a minimum investment of $5,000, but variances in certain circumstances may be made. Nevertheless, suitability standards for investment in an oil and gas syndicate are the most stringent placed on
any security offered to the public.
Management'sExperience and Net Worth
Although there are no explicit rules setting forth the requirement
of management's experience and net worth for oil and gas syndicates,
the Department takes the position that management must have the
requisite experience to carry out the proposed plan of operations of the
program. This is part of the overall determination that the offering
complies with Section 25140 of the Corporations Code which requires
that the Commissioner find the offering "fair, just and equitable."
Normally, no net worth requirement is imposed on the general partner
in oil and gas programs.
Investor Democracy Rights
The Department has recently altered its policy-oil and gas partnerships are now required to provide the same investor rights as those
imposed upon real estate syndications.i 3 Where the investor democracy rights jeopardize the taxable status of the partnership, similar
concessions are made for oil and gas syndicates as for real estate
syndications. With reference to the tax aspects of syndicates for
oil and gas properties, it is customary to require an opinion of counsel or a ruling from the Internal Revenue Service that the syndi53. Id. §§260.140.110, 260.140.112(c).
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cate will not be regarded as an association taxable as a corporation
under the Internal Revenue Code. The opinion of counsel should explain the legal basis for the express conclusion that the syndicate will
be taxed as a partnership by explaining the lack of corporate characteristics as set forth in the Internal Revenue regulations. The form
of this opinion can be substantially the same as that required for real
estate syndications.
The partnership agreement, as under the allocation of profit and
loss, should be explained to disclose to the limited partners the tax
consequences of gains and losses of the partnership. Each special feature of the oil and gas program which is claimed to be deductible by
the partnership should be individually discussed. Some items in this
area are intangible drilling costs, depletion, depreciation, lease acquisition costs, and geophysical costs. The other tax consequence items,
such as gain or loss on the sale of partnership units and effect upon dissolution of the partnership, should also be comprehensively discussed
in the tax consequences section of the prospectus.
CATTLE PROGRAMS

In recent years, there has been a dramatic increase in the number of publicly offered limited partnerships engaged in cattle-feeding
programs. Although there are many other types of cattle programs
which are securities (cattle-breeding programs, combination breeding
and feeding programs, and investment contracts in cattle), we are
mainly concerned here with the use of the limited partnership vehicle as a tax shelter in cattle-feeding programs. The Midwest Securities
Commissioners Association has adopted rules for the registration and
regulation of publicly offered cattle-feeding programs. California ap-

plies most of these rules.
There are significant areas of concern for administrators in cattle
programs. As in real estate syndications, there is a large potential
for conflict of interest among promoters, sponsors, and affiliates who
perform various services in the process of preparing a steer for market both on the feed lot and in the marketing process. Each program
is scrutinized on a case-by-case basis to insure compliance with the
adopted guidelines. Cattle feeding essentially consists of purchasing
calves or yearlings, fattening them on ranches or in feed lots, and selling
them for slaughter. The general partner arranges loans to the partnership to purchase the cattle and operates the feed lots. This produces a highly leveraged investment with a partner receiving high proportionate gain or loss on his investment.
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CompensationStructure
All expenses for organization of the partnership and selling of the
partnership interests to the public must be borne solely by the sponsor
if the sponsor is to receive the allowable 12 1/2 percent of the gross
cash receipts as a management fee for the first year of operation. 4 For
each additional year, the sponsor is permitted a 5/8 percent per month
interest on the net assets of the program. The sponsor must pay all
of its administrative and overhead expenses, and all other expenses of
the limited partnership are required to be billed and paid by the program.-, There are other areas where the sponsor or its affiliate will
receive additional front-end compensation. Mark-ups on feed costs
sold to the partnership and mark-ups on purchase of cattle are generally permissible when the actual cost to the partnership does not
exceed that price paid by nonaffiliated customers in the same locale at the time of purchase.
Conflicts of Interest
Most cattle programs have serious potential conflicts of interest
between the sponsors and their affiliates, who are usually the feed lot
operators and managers. Since the feed lot affiliate cannot charge
management fees or overhead fees which would be deemed additional
compensation not provided for in the rules, it has been suggested that
the affiliates often may find other ways to profit from the relationship. As rear-end compensation, the general partner or sponsor is permitted a 25 percent subordinated interest in the program's profits after
a return of 100 percent to the public investors of their investment.
Of course, the syndications least likely to have a serious conflict of
interest are those that are not selling their own cattle to the partnership,
nor feeding the partnership cattle at their own or affiliated feed lots,
nor marketing said cattle to their own affiliate. The only attack the
Department can make on conflicts is through the disclosure tool. The
prospectus must fully describe all conflicts of interest between public
investors and the sponsor and its affiliates.57 No fees or commissions
or other remuneration of any kind may be received by the sponsor or its
affiliates, either directly or indirectly in connection with the venture,
54. Midwest Securities Commissioners Association Guidelines for Registration of
Publicly Offered Cattle-Feeding Programs §I(C) (1) and (2) [hereinafter cited as Midwest Rules].
These rules are promulgated by the Midwest Securities Commissioners Association
as a statement of association policy for guidance of individual state administrators.
The rules are given effect only by adoption under state securities regulations.
55. Midwest Rules §I(C) (2).
56. Midwest Rules §I(C) (2).
57. Midwest Rules §(L) (1).
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which are not set out and fully disclosed in the prospectus. Additional prohibitions are placed upon the sale of partnership cattle to an
affiliate of the sponsor. No fee may be charged upon such a sale, 5s
and the program's cattle may not be sold to the sponsor or its affiliates except under limited circumstances where it is established that this
was the same price paid by a packer for consistent quality cattle from
other owners.
Suitability Standards
The Department applies the same basic test with regard to standards
of suitable investors in cattle programs that it does in oil and gas
syndicates. Depending on the amount of leveraging used in the purchase of the cattle and the financing of the feeding thereof, additional tax benefits are made available to the investor. The investor is
suitable when he is in a tax bracket which will permit him to realize
a reasonable income tax benefit from the proposed investment in the
program, whether or not the program is successful. It is significant
to note that the Midwest Rules do not explicitly provide for a net income or net worth requirement for investor participation. California
follows the same unwritten procedure. The Department realizes that
all cattle programs are different; and therefore, the suitability standards of net worth and net income requirements will vary accordingly.
In general, it can be said that for cattle-breeding programs which are
even more highly speculative than cattle-feeding programs, higher
suitability standards are imposed. With regard to the minimum investment by a public investor, the Midwest guidelines provide for a $5,000
minimum, all of which must have been paid at the date the venture
commences."' California does not take this approach. Again, the Department realizes that the minimum investment standard should vary
accordingly with the risks of each particular investment. Thus California takes a flexible approach to application of both prongs of the
suitability tests: net worth and net income standards and the minimum investment requirement.
ManagementsExperience and Net Worth
Significant experience is required by the general partner or a manager who will be hired by the partnership to supervise the buying,
breeding, or feeding of the cattle purchased by the partnership. According to the Midwest guidelines, such experience must be of at least
58. Midwest Rules §I(L)(3).
59. Midwest Rules §M(A).
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five years duration, with three years in feed lot operations exceeding
1,000 head of cattle capacity within recent date of the pending public
offering.60 California takes the position, as it does in oil and gas programs, that the experience of management is one of the factors which
is included in the finding of fairness under the "fair, just and equitable
test" of Corporations Code Section 25140. Although no precise guidelines are set, significant experience is required to satisfy this standard.
According to the Midwest Rules on cattle-feeding programs, the
sponsor must purchase for cash a minimum of $100,000 in participation interests in any entity which offers its cattle-feeding interests
to the public or, where the aggregate offering is less than $1,000,000,
the sponsor is required to purchase only 10 percent of the offering,
less underwriting discounts and commissions. 6" The sponsor's participation may also be reduced by 10 percent for each $35,000 in tangible net equity possessed by the sponsor. Thus the extent of the
sponsor's participation will vary depending upon the aggregate
amount of the offering.
Investor Democracy Rights
The same requirements as in real estate syndications or in oil and
gas limited partnerships are required for cattle programs.
Tax Aspects
As in other partnerships, a counsel's opinion or an Internal Revenue
Service Ruling confirming the tax treatment of the partnership as a
partnership, rather than an association taxable as a corporation, is required. Special items such as prepaid feed expenses, absent an Internal Revenue Service Ruling, should be explained. Additionally, the tax
counsel's opinion should address itself to the unsettled question in the
Internal Revenue law-whether such items will be deductible in the year
of prepayment. The depreciation recapture provisions of Section
1245 of the Internal Revenue Code apply to livestock. Therefore, the
depreciation aspects should be discussed along with a treatment of
Section 1251 property, which includes the disposition of property used
in farming.
Disclosure
There are certain areas in cattle programs which require explicit
treatment in the prospectus. A history of operations of the general
60. Midwest Rules §(A).
61. Midwest Rules §U(B)(3).
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partner or sponsor should be disclosed which includes all fees and
remunerations received by the sponsor or affiliate from any publicly
owned program for the past three years or for such shorter period as
the sponsor has been engaged in cattle programs.6 2 Disclosure is required of the average purchase weight of feed or cattle, average cost
per head, commissions paid for buying, average gain per pound, average cost of feed, interest rate on borrowed operating capital, other
management or selling charges, average sales weight by sex, average profit or loss per head by sex, and average equity investment per
head by sex. With these required disclosures, a realistic evaluation of
the past operating history of the promoter can be made. For any
data which are estimated, the assumptions underlying such estimations
and the basis therefore should be disclosed.
CROP SYNDICATIONS

The most common crop syndications are formed for the purpose of
growing pistachios, walnuts, citrus, fruit, grapes, and peaches. Significant risk exists when syndicators plant new crops in areas where
they have never grown before. The risk of natural disaster by
flood, frost, or wind may also be present. Since the crops may
take anywhere from one to seven years to become productive, there
can be an extended wait before the success of the venture can be
measured. Only limited tax benefits are available to crop syndication as compared to real estate, oil and gas, or cattle programs.
In fact, most are income-producing oriented. Rules and guidelines
for crop syndications are currently being drafted. It may safely be
assumed that they will reflect the principles applied to the regulation of
other types of syndication in the areas of compensation, suitability standards (which will generally be higher because of the higher risks involved), conflicts of interest, management experience and net worth,
and tax aspects.
In addition, the Department requires as to citrus and almond groves
that there be an explanation that the expenses incurred during the
first four years are nondeductible under Internal Revenue Code Section 278.
Projections
The Department permits projections based on actual experience for
one year after the start-up period or until the first crop is grown.
62. Midwest Rules §HI(B).
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CONCLUSION

The capital raised by syndicators and promoters of tax shelter programs is important to our economic well being. At the same time,
the last few years have seen such a demand for tax shelter vehicles
that many inexperienced promoters have gotten into the market to
help satisfy this demand. When insufficient talent exists to place
and manage the public's money in the amounts the public wants to
commit to this type of investment, the chances for failure rise markedly.
By an effective and judicious administration of the rules discussed
above, the Department is confident it can minimi e the risk of loss
to the public through unfair dealing or ill-conceived programs.

